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Chapitre 9

A Personal Report on Methodological
Developments in US Law
Stephen UTZ
Professor, School of Law, University of Connecticut

I. Introduction
A survey of contemporary legal research in the United States must
to some extent be personal and impressionistic. No one can see the
entire landscape or has the expertise to evaluate everything in it.
The pitfall of myopia is heightened by the enormous variety of current methods and results, the need to mention and evaluate areas
of specialty in which things are going well or poorly, and publication biases that should not influence content but inevitably do. The
already huge variety of books, journals, and commercial guides to
particular legal subjects has been overshadowed by an uncountable
array of electronically circulated working papers, blogs, symposia,
and conference proceedings. With that disclaimer, what follows is
my own view of what legal scholarship in the USA is like at the
present moment.
II. An anti-systematic background
At the outset, it is useful to note that, in comparison with the
legal literature of countries with code-based law, those of the United
States and other common law countries seem reluctant to address
problems of legal methodology directly. Our default approach has
bruylant

201

Stephen UTZ

been to rely on the shared attitudes and techniques of exegesis we
all learn in a relatively inarticulate fashion in the first year of law
school. Generally, my legal compatriots are not particularly conscious
that they might do more in this respect and that the failure to do so
can harm otherwise expert reasoning about the law. Nevertheless, the
USA has consistently produced a small but interesting literature on
distinctive issues of legal interpretation. Recently, that literature has
taken on a wider array of methodological puzzles and has begun to
exercise a distinctive influence on the judiciary and the community
of practicing lawyers as well as on academic lawyers who are not
primarily methodologists.
A wider theoretical background in the USA partly accounts for
the relatively little time devoted here to specific puzzles about legal
reasoning. Influential shifts in American legal thought – big movements associated with prominent legal thinkers like the American
Legal Realists or the inventors of Critical Legal Studies – have captured the high ground of public attention, leaving the task of surveying how law works in detail to languish. We seem instead to regard
comprehensive effort to understand law in all its branches as tedious,
the easy domain of retired judges and commercial digest authors.
Another influence that has diverted our attention from methodology is that of traditional legal pedagogy. The once-prevailing style
of teaching law in the United States, the “case method,” shaped all
thinking here about interpretation of the law for almost a century.
Harvard Law School invented this method while inventing itself as the
domestic standard of an academically ambitious professional school
for lawyers, influenced to a great extent by German universities’ recognition of the “science” of law. Using case-intensive discussion of
legal rules, the instructor could adopt a posture of agnosticism as to
the reasoning and holdings of particular cases, leaving it to students
to construct their own views on these matters. In this respect, the
case method became emblematic of a kind of skepticism about the
need for broad vision and generality. It left generations of American
lawyers with the lesson that one could get along perfectly well without a self-conscious understanding of legal methodology.
More theoretically minded early law professors quickly lent their
support to a debunking and castigation of “formalism,” which with
hindsight we can recognize not to have been a genuinely shared
view of earlier lawyers or lawyer academics, but an invented opponent of right thinking. H.L.A. Hart, writing roughly 60 years after
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the first attacks on formalism, labeled the attackers “rule skeptics”1.
He treated them gently, in examining their arguments and the weaknesses of their conclusions, but the label was itself a sort of revelation : it pointed to the movement’s lack of constructive conclusions.
Anti-formalism itself gave way to another, slightly less skeptical
movement in law teaching, associated with the term “legal process”2.
But during and after the Viet Nam War, radical skepticism of the
content of judicial decisions, focusing on American courts, arose.
The Critical Legal Studies Movement and related movements that
draw on some of the same hermeneutic criticism of the law revived
the American Legal Realists’ broad-brush doubts about legal institutions3. Finally, over the last decade or so, a new generation of
legal methodologists has emerged among US legal scholars. They
have called stressed problems of legal reasoning, some of which the
“Crits” also recognized, but have proposed less far-reaching diagnoses of the sources of these problems.
As a renewed interest in constructive legal methodology has come
to the fore, criticisms of “critical” theories of the law have arisen
as well. Earlier skeptical accounts of how law works are being supplanted by more affirmative accounts. Some of the more recent work
on legal methodology relies on specialized theories developed in linguistics and formal logic, as tools for understanding how statutes and
rules derived from case law should be interpreted.
Judges and practicing lawyers have long complained that academic legal scholarship – especially, law review articles – have little
relevance to their work. This may partly account for the emergence
of a large number of sophisticated legal journals, the content and
editorial procedures of which contrast sharply with those of lawschool-based law reviews. Despite their practice orientation, these
legal journals publish works of higher quality than was typical of
similar practitioner-edited journals thirty years ago. They are, however, well attuned to judicial and practitioner interests.

1.  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1961 ;
2d ed. 1997, ch.7.
2.  H. M. Hart Jr. and A. M. Sacks, The Legal Process : Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law, New York : Foundation Press, 1956 ; S. Utz,
Problems in American Legal Methodology, in Rechtsgeschäft, Methodenlehre, und
Darüber Hinaus : Liber Amicorum für Detlef Leenen, Berlin, C.H. Beck, 2012.
3.  D. Kennedy, “Form & Substance in Private Law Adjudication”, 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 1685, 1976.
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Beneath the radar, however, it must be emphasized that legal academics now embrace a far less abstract approach to teaching their
subject matter. There is currently a vogue for more experiential teaching – for the use of various forms of simulation exercises in what
previously were strictly verbal investigations of legal content. Even
philosophers of law are often prepared to take their students to courthouses for a glimpse of what practicing lawyers do well (or not).
III. A diversity of platforms
For many American lawyers, the term “law review” means a legal
journal published by a law school, often without limitation to a specific area of the law. This kind of law review became prevalent
during the early decades of the twentieth century, when the Harvard
method to legal instruction, referred to above, was taking hold as
the standard. At first, the faculty of law schools wrote most of the
articles, selected the rest, and oversaw the work of student contributors, who wrote “notes” or short articles on new legal developments,
mainly recent judicial decisions. All that changed during the 1930s,
when one law faculty after another decided to leave the selection and
editing of all law review articles to student editors. This notorious
abandonment of responsibility by law professors has always been a
target for criticism. In a 1936 law review article, Yale law professor Fred Rodell excoriated the quality of both the writing and the
content of most law review articles4. Many have echoed him since.
Most recently, Justice John Roberts, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, has said : “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and
the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel
Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that
wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar”5. This and an array of
similar judicial dismissals of the law review literature are collected
in a recent New York Times article that may be of greater influence
than the eminent judges it quotes. Adam Liptak concluded in this
article that : “The general debate on how to improve law reviews
is an old one, and there is little prospect of change. Law reviews
4.  F. Rodell, “Goodbye to Law Reviews”, 23 Virginia L. Rev. 38-45,
November 1936.
5.  A. Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews That Lawyers Love to Hate, New York
Times, October 21, 2013.
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will continue to publish long, obscure and dated articles, and their
readership and influence will continue to drop”6.
Not only are US law reviews reviled for their irrelevance, but
it is also characteristic for them to publish only articles of much
greater length than academic legal journals of other countries normally publish. Often, these long articles propose a framework for
the core argument that is as complex and difficult to present as the
primary argument. That is because the shared aspiration of so many
such articles is to “break the mold”, to be a “game changer” in an
area that may itself not be widely recognized to have a status quo
against which the article’s novelty can be measured. This pretentiousness is no doubt a consequence, to some extent, of the role articles
play in the “tenure process,” the crucial evaluation of junior faculty
for permanent retention on a faculty.
IV. Absence of Treatises
The disappearance of scholarly treatises must surely strike most
legal academics and practicing lawyers from other jurisdictions as
among the most peculiar features of the US legal scene. It would
have surprised many in this country only a few years ago to be told
that treatises were about to disappear, like dinosaurs in an ancient
ice age.
The term “legal treatise” is used by my countrymen to refer to
more than one kind of compendious book with legal subject matter.
The term covers generally any book that surveys an entire area of
the law. Now that the law in all countries that have highly developed
legal systems has attained a high degree of complexity, the subject
matter of a treatise can be only a small part of what would once
have been itself a relative specialized area of the law. For example,
the law of products liability, once a small part of tort law in the
common-law countries, is now so highly developed and elaborate
that it no longer makes sense to treat it as a subtopic of the earlier
field that spawned it.
US treatises, however, fall into three fundamental categories. The
older category is that once dominated by academic writers and often
dedicated to emerging or less obvious general areas of law. Among
them were the classic treatises by Grant Gilmore and Charles Black
6.  Idem.
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on admiralty law and by Boris Bittker and James Eustace on corporate tax law7. Other treatises were and still are sponsored by commercial legal publishers and usually written by non-academic authors.
The quality of this second category is mixed, although some are of
excellent. The third category includes shorter treatises written primarily by academic authors and intended to serve as “hornbooks” or
supplementary texts for specific law school courses ; these usually
do not attempt to cover an entire legal area but only the selected
portions of an area that can practicably be covered in a one- or twosemester law course. Examples include Joseph Singer’s treatise on
property law8 and William Stoebuck and Dale Whitman on property
law9. This last category are not works of serious scholarly ambition
but are understood by their audience to be selective not only in their
coverage of topics but also in their reporting of cases and statutes.
V. Conspicuous parts of US legal research
The reader may reasonably anticipate that a more detailed view
of what goes on in a country’s legal literature should be organized
into subject or topic areas. If divisions of that sort were clearly visible in the US literature, a survey could easily reflect them. In fact,
both subject matter and research methods must be mentioned in order
to give a useful overview here. The methodology of legal reasoning
is not at issue. For example, the law-and-economics movement has
only occasional and controversial relevance to court decisions and the
interpretative work of jurists, although it looms large in law reviews.
The same is true of the current vogue for empirical and especially
statistical methods of legal argumentation in law reviews – this is not
reflected in the work of judges or practitioners ; neither are gleanings from cognitive science or behavioral economics. Indeed, the
most natural place to begin the present survey is with schemes of
research that are not confined to one or a few subject areas.

7.  G. Gilmore and C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, New York, Foundation
Press, 1975 ; Boris Bittker and James Eustace, Federal Income Taxation of
Corporations and Shareholder, Boston, Warren, Gorham & Lamon, 2000, now listed
as [“with the collaboration of Gersham Goldstein”].
8.  J. Singer, Property, Boston, Aspen, 3d ed. 2009.
9.  W. B. Stoebuck and D. A. Whitman, Law of Property, New York,
Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2000.
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Of these, until recently, the most prominent were law-and-economics and various types of “critical” legal theory. Exponents of both
of these self-consciously systematic approaches held themselves out
initially as inimical to each other – economic analysis was thought
to dispel the apparent relevance of interest group politics on the law,
while critical theory purported to expose the deeply rooted relevance
precisely of class and group interests. The heyday of this opposition,
however, has passed. Even the principal spokespersons of the now
venerable Critical Legal Studies movement have begun to declare it
irrelevant to current debates10. Other critical approaches have also
begun to lose steam and to soften the defiant tone that was formerly characteristic of them11. “L & E,” as the law and economics
movement is known to legal academics, has not disappeared but has
lost its oppositional character and become politically neutral : it has
prominent proponents on both the right and the left12.
Statistical methods, in the US as elsewhere, now enjoy great
prestige in academic legal research agenda13. What is most notable
about the US version of this phenomenon is the influence it has
had on how criminal and administrative law is investigated (study
of stops, Richard Parker). Criminal law, in particular, once attracted
very little academic interest. In the US, criminal law is overwhelmingly the product of state legislatures, not of Congress. Local variations and the more modest level of expertise and skill exhibited by
state legal codes have made it less interesting to researchers, not to
mention the comparative rarity of problems of interpretation raised
by criminal statutes. Statistical methods are also being applied here
10.  D. Kennedy, “Form & Substance in Private Law Adjudication”, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1685, 1976 ; M. Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence
of Rights and Democracy-Based Worries”, 38 Wake Forest Law Review 813 (2003).
11.  R. Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, NYU Press, 2d edition
2012 ; P. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
U. Press, 1991.
12.  L. Kaplow, “Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives : Intergenerational
Distributive Justice and Efficiency”, 74 University of Chicago Law Review 79,
2007 ; S. M. Shavell, “Strict Liability versus Negligence”, 9 Journal of Legal
Studies 1, 1980 ; P. Siegelman and T. Baker, “The Law & Economics of Liability
Insurance”, in J. Arlen (ed.), Research Handbook in the Economics of Tort,
Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2013 ; T. Ulen, “The Economics of Tort Defenses”,
in J. Arlen, (Ed.), The Law and Economics of Tort Liability, Cheltenham, UK,
Edward Elgar, 2011 ; R. Posner, “Statutory Interpretation – In the Classroom and
in the Courtroom”, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 1983.
13.  See, e.g., H. E. Jackson et al., Analytical Methods for Lawyers, New York,
Foundation Press, 2nd ed., 2011.
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to employment law14, law reviews themselves,15 welfare law16, law
practice and ethical issues17, banking and consumer credit law18. In
the recent hiring season for new law professors, a disproportionate
fraction of job candidates presented work that employed statistical
methods.
But statistical reasoning is not suited to many complex policy
issues. In the field of tax policy, for example, it is difficult to see
how the necessary simplifications of null hypotheses and assumptions about the independence of variables can be adapted to questions
about the economic distortions caused by highly flexible tax rules
for changes in corporate form, for the amortization of investments
in intangibles, and so forth. Early writers on political economy –
Ricardo, Say, McCullough, Mill – devoted roughly one-third of the
lengths of their ground-breaking books to income taxation, and this
was no accident. The scope but also the uncertain empiricality of
modern economics developed naturally only when the viewpoint of
the public and not only that of autocratic sovereigns first became
relevant to the problems of public finance.
Although modern economics is certainly not the only discipline
that should or does influence tax policy today, it is still the most
highly developed tool the area has at its disposal, and the peculiar resistance of economic theory to empirical testing has not been
changed by the growth in number and inventiveness of empirical
economics. In the US, the National Bureau of Economic Research
is the most important umbrella group and promoter of macroeconomic research. It maintains a database of working papers and more
formally published work and commissions experts to summarize the
research projects and results of individual economists. While only a
fraction of the NBER’s work focuses on tax-related issues, it is a
very large fraction. The data-driven portion of this fraction points
out intriguing but usually inconclusive correlations between economic
14.  S. S. Pandya and P. Siegelman, “Underclaiming and Overclaiming”,
38 Law and Social Inquiry 836-862, 2013.
15.  A. Yaphe, “Taking Note of Notes : Student Legal Scholarship in Theory
and Practice”, 62 J. Leg. Ed. 259, 2012.
16.  K. S.Gustafson, Cheating Welfare : Public Assistance and the
Criminalization of Poverty, New York, NYU Press, 2012.
17.  L. C. Levin, “Guardians at the Gates : The Backgrounds, Career Paths
and Professional Development of Private U.S. Immigration Lawyers”, 34 Law &
Social Inquiry 399, 2009.
18.  P. McCoy, “A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending”, 38 Akron L.
Rev. 725, 2005.
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phenomena and tax rates, adjustments to tax bases, and tax design
generally. In comparison with these studies, bolder model-building
projects, of which the most prominent by far is optimal tax theory,
have a greater influence on policy debates, precisely because they
speak in more general terms and offer hypotheses about broad tax
design choices19. On the whole, broad theoretical work is of greater
relevance than small-scale empirical studies to scholarly discussions
of tax policy. To the extent that US legislators in Congress or at the
state level pay any attention to fact or theory, they are also more
likely to respond to broad design advice than to incremental and
tentative findings, even though only the latter are directly based on
empirical data. Accordingly, US tax law journals are still dominated
by narrow discussions of existing law and theoretical discussions
without evidence-based foundations.
One notable development in US academic research is a new interest in statutory interpretation. It must first be said that any activity
at all in this area is a significant change from what has been a
longer period of stagnation. At infrequent intervals, great names in
American law, like Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., John Chipman
Gray, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Edward Levy, and Lon Fuller, have
published brief discussions of the major problems raised by precedent and the common law. On the whole, their contributions have
been elementary or even superficial, offering not much more than
a restatement of the obvious puzzle : whatever claims of fidelity
to precedent judges may make, is there any reality to the supposed
continuity of judge-made law that is not itself subject to articulate,
independent standards ? Most lawyers in this country are satisfied
with Ronald Dworkin’s account of the continuity as comparable to
that of a game in which the players each write a chapter of a novel,
without first agreeing on its plot, able only to see the previous chapters20. The weakness of this account lies in the fact that the players
of such a game, and common-law judges, can of course do whatever
they please, as long as they maintain some sort of continuity : each
player may otherwise feel found by a different standard or even
consider herself bound by no standard at all. In brief, the existing

19.  S. Utz, Tax Policy : An Introduction and Survey of the Principal Debates,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, West Publishing Co. 1993, ch. 13.
20.  R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard U. Press,
1986.
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literature on legal methodology in this country has itself been exhibited a relatively superficial continuity.
Some recent writers, however, devote their attention exclusively
to statutory interpretation, sidestepping the broader discussion of
the common-law method and instead taking its basic features for
granted21. Notably, Professor William Eskridge of Yale Law School
argued for “dynamic statutory interpretation,” making somewhat more
precise a theme that is not new to the legal academy but had not
previously been singled out for close examination22.It is that statutory interpretation should be governed above all by the purpose of
the statute in question, in an appropriately wide sense of the word
“purpose,” which may vary with context. A court’s reading of a
statute that sets forth the rights of landlords and tenants should be
sensitive to whether the legislature wanted to preserve the quality
of the rental housing stock or to safeguard the parties’ intentions.
Separately, Scott Brewster and Ernest Weinrib, both at Harvard Law
School, have engaged in an elaborate debate about the analogical
reasoning in the common law23. Brewster, trained in philosophy,
proposed that what is often described as analogical reasoning from
precedent is better understood as “abduction” from specific fact patterns to be brought under a single rule. Weinrib argued that there are
other varieties of analogical reasoning to be found in familiar parts
of the common law. Neither, however, addresses the elastic scope
of the term “analogy,” or considers its possible over-use by the few
legal methodologists in the older US legal literature24.
Approaching the problem of method from a different angle, legal
scholars have recently highlighted problems raised by the lawyerly
tradition, perhaps in all common-law jurisdictions but at least in the
US, of misreading referentially opaque language in statutes and other
legal materials. Philosophers and linguists, since the late 19th century, have noted and attempted to explain more fully how words
function when they follow certain types of verbs, especially those
21.  J. Scott, “Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation”,
98 Geo. L. J. 331, 2010.
22.  W. Eskridge, A Republic of Statutes : The New American Constitution,
Yale University Press, 2010.
23.  S. Brewster, “Exemplary Reasoning : Semantics, Pragmatics, and the
Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy”, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 923, 1996 ;
L. L. Weinreb, Legal Reason : The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument, Cambridge,
England, Cambridge U.P., 2005.
24.  Utz, 2012, pp. 300-307.
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that express the content of mental states or rely on such content
for their truth value. “I’m looking for a dog” is ambiguous because
the speaker may be looking either for a particular dog or for any
dog at all. Medieval logicians had already labeled this feature of
descriptive language by calling the first sort of meaning de dicto
and the second de re25. Many languages, like French, set apart some
or all linguistic contexts in which words are used de dicto and not
de re by the use of the subjunctive mode of the verb within these
contexts. For example, “Je veux que tu me rendes mon pull” means
that I want you to return the sweater I consider mine, even if there
is no such thing26.
One of the foremost exponents of current American methodological research, who uses linguistic and logical research tools, is
Professor Jill Anderson. She has pointed out a pattern of word-byword interpretation by courts that overlooks aspects of the meaning of sentences that would be obvious to nontechnical speakers of
English27. For example, she analyzes the repeated judicial misinterpretation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, which prohibits
discrimination against the disabled. The act defines disability as the
impediment of “one or more life functions” of the individual. Courts
have definition to imply that they cannot find a defendant’s conduct
to be discriminatory on the basis of disability, unless the plaintiff can
prove that the defendant discriminated with respect to a particular
life function of the plaintiff that is impaired. Thus, a defendant’s
admitted discrimination against an individual on the grounds that she
“was disabled” would not be actionable. It cannot be said of such
misinterpretation that it is even excessively literal, since no ordinary
user of English would interpret the statute in this way. Similarly,
Professor Anderson has criticized the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the word “any” in Coraco Pharmaceutical Labs v. Novo Nordisk,28
on the grounds that the Court mistook the limiting function of that
word by mistakenly treating it as having the same meaning as the
definite article, when the word can in fact mean some one thing
among many of a certain kind. The fallacy in the Court’s reasoning
25.  P. Geach, Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval
and Modern Theories, Cornell Univ. Press 1962.
26.  J.-P. Sartre, L’Être et le Néant. Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique,
Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1943.
27.  J. Anderson, “Just Semantics : The Lost Readings of the Americans with
Disabilities Act”, 117 Yale L.J. 992, 2008, p. 210.
28. 132 S. Ct. 1670, 566 US − (S. Ct. April 17, 2012).
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is that highlighted in Sartre’s observation concerning de dicto and de
re utterances, discussed in the previous paragraph.
VI. Conclusion
Despite the absence of a broad tradition of methodological study
among US legal scholars, the modest literature by my compatriots on
distinctive issues of legal interpretation has grown markedly in quantity and quality over the last two decades. Contributors to this literature have identified previously unnoticed methodological puzzles,
and their proposed analyses of these puzzles have begun to exercise
a notable influence on judges, practicing lawyers, and the scholarly
world. The prominence of American Legal Realism, the pedagogical
Legal Process Movement, and the more recent Critical Legal Studies
Movement formerly distracted attention from narrowly framed questions of legal interpretation, coordination, and renovation. This may
have contributed to the fall in prestige of legal treatises and law
reviews concerned with incremental changes in the law, the sort of
legal development that is of greatest concern to the bench and the
bar. Prompted by idiosyncracies of statutory interpretation, however,
a new generation of methodologists have found these narrow questions interesting and have begun to propose analytical responses to
them that may change the course of judicial interpretation in particular cases, while also alerting practicing lawyers and scholars that
some of their most deeply rooted instincts, carefully cultivated in
traditional law-school instruction, are due for re-examination and,
in some instances, correction. The methodological toolbox of these
new scholars includes empirical methods, especially, those borrowed
from the social sciences, as well as economic, linguistic, and logical modes of analysis. As a consequence of this turn of events, it
may be hoped that courts and law schools alike will focus more
consciously on core questions of interpretation and of the systemic
coherence of US law.
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